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Assessing the Structure of Non-Routine Decision Processes in Airline Operations 
Control 
Unfamiliar severe disruptions challenge airline operations control professionals 
most, as their expertise is stretched to its limits. This study has elicited the 
structure of airline operations control professionals’ decision process during 
unfamiliar disruptions by mapping three macrocognitive activities on the decision 
ladder: sensemaking, option evaluation, and action planning. The relationship 
between this structure and decision quality was measured. A simulated task was 
staged, based on which think aloud protocols were obtained. Results show that 
the general decision process structure resembles the structure of experts working 
under routine conditions, in terms of the general structure of the macrocognitive 
activities, and the rule-based approach used to identify options and actions. 
Surprisingly, high quality of decision outcomes was found to relate to the use of 
rule-based strategies. This implies that successful professionals are capable of 
dealing with unfamiliar problems by reframing them into familiar ones, rather 
than to engage in knowledge-based processing. 
Keywords: decision making; airline operations control; fractionated expertise; 
macrocognitive activities 
We examined the macrocognitive structure of airline operations control 
professionals’ decision process during a simulated unfamiliar disruption in 
relation to decision quality. Results suggest that successful professionals are 
capable of dealing with unfamiliar problems by reframing them into familiar 
ones, rather than to engage in knowledge-based processing. 
Introduction 
In the dynamic environment of Airline Operations Control, managing the network of 
schedules in the face of unexpected events is the main task of decision makers. Low 
impact disruptive events happen relatively often, and most operations control decision 
makers are experienced professionals who have dealt with such disruptions many times. 
High impact disruptions on the other hand, don’t occur frequently. This study focuses 
on the decision process of professionals during such disruptions at one airline. Most 
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studies suggest that expertise is adaptive, implying that Airline Operations Control 
professionals should be able to deal effectively with novel situations. However, 
operations control management of the airline in question has observed that under 
comparable non-routine circumstances decision outcomes vary considerably case by 
case. This is problematic, because wrong decisions under highly disruptive 
circumstances can lead to loss of control, resulting not only in potentially high costs as 
flight delays accumulate, but also in reputational damage. Moreover, insight in the 
decision making process itself is lacking, and hence Airline Operations Control 
management believes they have no control over the decision process. To be able to 
effectively support and improve this process, in the present study we address the 
following question: what is the structure of the cognitive decision process of 
professionals when dealing with unfamiliar situations, and how is this structure related 
to decision quality? 
In this article, we will first outline how this research fits into the current body of 
naturalistic decision making (NDM) literature by describing the general context of 
airline operations control decision making under non-routine circumstances, after which 
we will elaborate on the expertise of professionals in operations control. Next, we 
present the model used to study decision processes. We will then elaborate on the 
methodology used, and finally results are presented and discussed. 
Decision Making in Operations Control Disruption Management 
Disruption management decision making in Airline Operations Control has mainly been 
studied from the perspective of developing decision support systems based on 
mathematical grounds (see for example Abdelghany, Abdelghany, and Ekollu 2008; 
Bratu and Barnhart 2006; Clausen et al. 2010). However, such an approach not only 
fails to appreciate the complexity of the Airline Operations Control work environment, 
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but also ignores the underlying cognitive decision making processes (Bruce 2011; Feigh 
and Pritchett 2010).  
The study of professional decision makers in their natural environment is typical 
of NDM research, especially when professionals need to make decisions under complex 
or difficult circumstances (Ross, Shafer, and Klein 2006). Many of the contextual 
factors defined by Zsambok (1997) that are considered ‘difficult circumstances’ apply 
to operations control decision making at an airline. Airline Operations Control 
professionals often operate under high uncertainty as unexpected events, like internal 
failures such as maintenance or crewing issues, or external events, such as inclement 
weather, regularly disrupt the planned flight schedule (Ball et al. 2007). Multiple 
solutions are usually available to decision makers (Yu et al. 2003), but these often 
require making conflicting trade-offs between the main elements of an airline operation: 
passenger flows, aircraft and crew (Kohl et al. 2007). Inevitably this puts a strain on the 
airline’s profit margins, as disruptions will often lead to delays or cancellations 
(Thengvall, Bard, and Yu 2000), which can  result in excessive delay costs (Wu 2005). 
Also, the airline’s reputation is at stake if Airline Operations Control professionals fail 
to make the right decisions, and instead risk the airline to make the national headlines. 
Although disruptive events happen quite often, their impact is usually limited to 
a small number of flights. Moreover, Airline Operations Control professionals are 
familiar with most events. Such disruptions include for example delays caused by 
unexpected aircraft maintenance or ATC delays at a destination airport. The current 
research is concerned with disruptions of a different kind; those that do not happen very 
often and hence are relatively unfamiliar, and that can potentially have a great impact on 
the flight schedule. In this study, this is considered to be the case when delays for the 
flight schedule on average add up to more than one hour per flight, as decision 
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processes under this condition are distinctly different from decision processes during 
solving individual disruptions. Disruptions like these would include delays of a large 
number of flights extending over multiple arrival and departure peaks within the 
network schedule, caused by irregular adverse weather conditions in the airport area. 
Note that, even though they do have a significant impact on the flight schedule, 
emergencies (for example, a crash) and contingencies (for example, events that cause 
political instability in certain flight destinations and result in severe safety issues) were 
excluded from this research, because the studied airline’s procedures and decision 
making processes under these circumstances extend beyond the boundaries of the 
Airline Operations Control departments. 
Expertise in Operations Control 
It is generally acknowledged that expertise is domain specific. However, what is often 
overlooked is that expertise is also not necessarily generalizable across different tasks 
(Shanteau, 2012). Although experts still have the ability to use certain types of decision 
strategies when working outside their area of expertise, such as mental simulation and 
progressive deepening, the quality of experts’ solutions is reduced to the level of 
beginners (Schraagen, 1993). 
Bruce (2011) investigated for several types of disruptions how gaining initial situational 
awareness and generating various courses of action is affected by airline operations 
controllers’ experience and expertise. Experts were identified based on years of domain 
experience. Although this is an important predictor of expertise, it is not necessarily 
sufficient to reach an expert level of achievement (Ericsson 2006; Feltovich, Prietula, 
and Ericsson, 2006; Shanteau et al. 2002), especially under non-routine conditions. 
When confronted with high impact disruptions, those operations controllers classified as 
experts might not always be functioning on an expert level per se, due to the infrequent 
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occurrence of these types of disruptions, the unstructured nature of the environment, 
and consequently the non-routine character of the task at hand. As professionals are 
confronted with relatively few opportunities for developing expertise, amplified by the 
lack of feedback on the quality of decisions taken, they lack deliberate practice, which 
drives development of expertise (Ericsson and Charness 1994). This may result in 
‘fractionated expertise’, as professionals will show expertise in some but not all of their 
activities (Kahneman and Klein 2009).  
Fractionation of expertise is common in actual work situations, due to job rotation, lack 
of feedback in complex work environments, and increased pressure to develop expertise 
quickly. Yet, although this phenomenon is common in practice, it has been virtually 
neglected in most studies of expertise that assume full-time dedicated attention over a 
long period of time (for a review, see Feltovich et al. 2006). Hence, the current research 
aims to acknowledge the task specificity of expertise, by studying experienced 
professionals who operate under conditions of fractionated expertise as they are 
confronted with unfamiliar disruptions within their domain. 
Decision Process Structure 
Multiple models of NDM have been developed that aid the elicitation of the cognitive 
structure of the decision process. The Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model of 
Klein (1993) and Rasmussen’s decision ladder (1976) are the most frequently used 
(Lipshitz 1993; Naikar 2010). Several researchers have proposed models that integrate 
parts of these two models (see for example Hoc and Amalberti 1995; Lintern 2010; 
Vicente, Mumaw, and Roth 2004). Of these, we considered the modified version of the 
decision ladder by Lintern (2010) to be the most suitable to represent both implicit as 
well as explicit decision processes (Lintern 2009). This was an important requirement 
because we expect Airline Operations Control professionals to use both types (Bruce 
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2011). Moreover, the decision ladder can represent decision making under unfamiliar or 
difficult circumstances (Naikar 2010), and was therefore chosen for our analysis as a 
suitable model for representing professionals’ decision processes. The decision ladder is 
described here based on Lintern’s (2010) terminology of cognitive states (states of 
knowledge) and cognitive processes (information processes). 
Originally, the decision ladder was intended to function as a formative model 
that displays which cognitive processes might be used rather than those that are used 
(Rasmussen 1986), and many researchers use it as such (see for example Jenkins 2012; 
McIlroy and Stanton 2015; Naikar, Moylan, and Pierce 2006). Other applications 
include, for example, analysis of complex socio-technical systems (Stanton & Bessell 
2014), analysis of team cognitive work (Ashoori et al. 2014), and development of 
decision aids in healthcare (Dhukaram & Baber 2015). The decision ladder also has 
descriptive value, especially when used as a template with which to analyse verbal 
protocols (Vicente 1999). Our approach focuses on description and analysis of 
individual decision making behaviour, thereby explicitly linking the information 
processing steps on the ladder to macrocognitive activities of decision makers. This 
behaviour usually relies not only on knowledge-based transitions that follow the 
perimeter of the decision ladder, but also on rule- and skill-based transitions based on 
experience with prior solutions (Rasmussen 1986; Vicente 1999).  
Macrocognitive activities  
We will focus in particular on macrocognitive activities that can be fitted with the 
decision ladder (as shown in figure 1), such as sensemaking and planning (Klein, Klein, 
and Klein 2000; Schraagen, Klein, and Hofmann 2008). The macrocognitive activities 
identified in this research distinguish themselves from other cognitive activities based 
on the natural hierarchy of information processing proposed by Newell (1990). At the 
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lower end of this hierarchy, processes on the cognitive band are measured in 
milliseconds, whereas higher order cognitive processes are measured in seconds or 
minutes. Based on their higher information processing time, macrocognitive activities 
are comprised of the smaller individual cognitive elements on the decision ladder.  
The first macrocognitive activity, situation assessment or analysis, is represented in the 
left leg of the decision ladder (Lintern 2010). The three cognitive states in this leg 
coincide with the three levels of Endsley’s (1995) model of situation awareness: 
perception of elements (alerted to dimensions of the situation), comprehension of these 
elements (aware of current system state), and anticipating future events (aware of future 
system state). Klein, Moon, and Hoffman (2006) view sensemaking as the process by 
which situation awareness is achieved. Hence, the cognitive processes and states in this 
part of the decision ladder will be subsumed under the heading of ‘sensemaking’.  
After making sense of the situation, decision makers are faced with response 
planning (Vicente, Mumaw, and Roth 2004), at least if the situation is unfamiliar and no 
pre-planned responses are readily available. Response planning starts with value 
judgment (Rasmussen, Pejtersen, and Goodstein 1994). In the cognitive processes and 
cognitive states embedded in this part of the decision ladder, decision makers generate 
one or multiple options and assess these explicitly based on their goals, after which they 
will select a suitable option or ‘target state’. Hence, in this part of the decision ladder 
we do not only include the macrocognitive function of option generation, as activities 
here are also concerned with evaluating these options. We therefore named this 
macrocognitive activity on the decision ladder ‘option evaluation’. 
Finally, in the right leg of the decision ladder, actions are planned that need to be 
carried out in order to arrive at the target state. In the bottom right cognitive state of the 
ladder, decision makers identify whether the chosen plan achieves the goal. Unlike 
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option evaluation, this involves no analytic comparison of options (Lintern 2010). 
Hence, the cognitive states and processes in the right leg of the decision ladder are part 
of the activity of ‘action planning’. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
Structure of macrocognitive activities for unfamiliar problems 
Many studies have shown how different aspects of macrocognitive activities may differ 
between experts and novices during problem solving (see for example Glaser and Chi 
1988; Kobus, Procter, and Holste 2001; Randel, Pugh, and Reed 1996; Simon and 
Simon 1978). However, as argued earlier, these differences cannot be directly translated 
to experienced professional’s problem solving strategies on novel tasks.  
Experienced decision makers usually use a mix of decision making strategies 
(Salas, Rosen, and DiazGranados 2010), and switch more easily than novices between 
rule- and knowledge-based behaviour (Farrington-Darby and Wilson 2006). In general, 
rule-based processes are more reliable than knowledge-based processes (Hobbs and 
Williamson 2002). But reapplying past strategies to new situations based on stored rules 
can be inappropriate (Dane 2010), and can lead to severe and systematic errors (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974).  Especially in complex environments, decision makers run the 
risk of using the wrong strategies (Clewley and Stupple 2015; Kozlowski 1998).  
In the current research, both knowledge and rule-based transitions are 
interpreted in terms of Lintern’s integrated decision ladder model (2010). A transition 
between cognitive states is considered knowledge-based if it follows the perimeter of 
the decision ladder. Rule-based transitions in the centre of the decision ladder are 
redefined as recognition-primed activities that were originally part of the RPD model. 
At any time during sensemaking activities, decision makers can recognize actions and 
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commence with action planning. Based on mental simulation, decision makers can loop 
back to sensemaking activities and evaluate information more thoroughly. 
In unfamiliar situations decision makers are more likely to rely on knowledge-
based transitions, shown at the perimeter of the decision ladder, due to a lack of rules 
(Rasmussen 1986). Moreover, it is generally assumed that decision makers can only 
adequately deal with non-routine problems in an ill-structured environment by explicitly 
evaluating options (see for example Klein 1989; Lipshitz 1997). However, this does 
require that decision makers acknowledge the limits of their expertise and know when 
to switch between knowledge and rule-based strategies (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). 
Hence, the current study will examine the relationship between the use of different 
strategies for each of the macrocognitive activities and quality of the decisions taken.  
Method 
Participants 
This research focused on decision processes of Airline Operations Control decision 
makers at a European airline. At the airline studied, each shift two operations controllers 
(one responsible for the European schedule, the other one for the intercontinental 
schedule) work under the supervision of a duty manager. Ten out of twenty operations 
controllers and five out of seven duty managers participated voluntarily in the research: 
resulting in 15 subjects for the experiment.  
During routine operations, the duty managers and operations controllers have 
distinct responsibilities. A routine disruption would include for example a delay of an 
inbound intercontinental flight due to a technical issue. The operations controller 
decides whether to delay several outbound flights to ensure connections for transfer 
passengers, or rebook passengers onto later flights. The duty manager’s main task is 
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monitoring the overall decision making process, and ensuring smooth cooperation 
between the different Airline Operations Control departments, such as maintenance and 
crew planning. For scenarios with a potentially big impact on the flight schedule, 
responsibilities of the duty managers and the operations controllers intersect due to 
either the timing and/or the size of the event. Non-routine issues are usually escalated to 
the duty manager, because these often involve problems that transcend individual flights 
or aircraft and hence have a bigger impact on the flight schedule. An example would be 
the issuing of an operator bulletin by an aircraft manufacturer, signalling a newfound 
technical issue with a specific aircraft type that needs to be addressed within a 24 hour 
period. In such a case, the duty manager has final responsibility in the decisions that 
need to be made, as he is also the one who needs to inform the Airline Operations 
Control management. He would however usually take those decisions in cooperation 
with the operations controllers. 
Proficiency levels of participants were estimated by using two of the methods 
listed by Hoffman and Lintern (2006). All but one of the subjects have a minimum of 
3000 hours of experience in their current function, and nine have more than 10.000 
hours of experience. Only one participant had 9.000 instead of over 10.000 hours of 
experience within the Airline Operations Control domain. Interviews with Airline 
Operations Control management revealed that, based on performance reviews and 
hiring standards, all of the participants have at least reached the level of journeyman 
(Hoffman et al. 1995).  
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Procedure 
Preparation 
Woods (2003) distinguishes ‘natural history techniques’ (waiting to see what happens) 
and ‘staged world studies’ (staging situations of interest through simulation). As major 
disruptions do not present themselves frequently enough for our purposes, and to ensure 
comparability between cases, a simulated task was staged. Since the focus of this 
research is on identifying decision strategies, think aloud was selected as the method of 
choice. Using this method it is possible to gain insight into various cognitive 
components of thought processes, such as underlying goals, strategies and decisions 
(Ericsson and Simon 1993). 
The experiment was conducted by two experimenters, one of which has ample 
experience as a quality process engineer at the studied airline’s operations control 
centre. In preparation for the experiment, the other experimenter (insert initials of first 
author) familiarized herself for a year with the organisation by observing and 
interviewing the operations controllers and duty managers on the job, both during 
regular operational activities and during unexpected events that caused disruptions to 
the operations schedule. A fictional case was constructed for the simulation session, to 
prevent the risk of any of the participants recognizing the scenario and relying on 
memory to formulate decision outcomes instead of actually going through the decision 
making process. To ensure a high level of unfamiliarity with the case, interviews about 
actual severe disruptive events they had witnessed in the past were held with several 
different operations controllers and duty managers. These interviews revealed that 
although isolated elements of such events can occur more frequently and are familiar in 
isolation, it is the combination of elements that creates surprising dynamics which 
contribute to unfamiliarity of events.  For example, heavy snow by itself does not occur 
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frequently, but is relatively familiar in isolation because its impact on runway capacity 
and hence on the flight schedule is usually clear. However, if this occurs in combination 
with other elements such as low hotel capacity, limited transportation means to and 
from the airport, and low availability of spare aircraft, what seemed to be a relatively 
controlled event can take a turn for the worse. Based on the interviews, a case was 
constructed in consultation with a former duty manager, thereby not only ensuring a 
high level of unfamiliarity but also keeping the case scenario sufficiently realistic. 
Finally, the case was compared to historical data, ensuring no comparable event had 
indeed happened in the past ten years.   
A scenario was constructed based on heavy precipitation conditions in winter, 
which would severely impact the departure and arrival capacity at the airport. 
Participants were first required to determine the impact of the weather conditions on the 
flight schedule, after which they had to specify what actions they thought would be 
appropriate. To be able to take such decisions, participants were allowed to look up 
additional real-time information (for example, about crewing or maintenance) as they 
would be able to do in reality. Since live data was used, all experimental sessions were 
scheduled on operationally similar days to ensure that simulation sessions were 
maximally comparable. By using this approach, a balance was ensured between keeping 
the task both maximally simple and similar to a real life situation (Ericsson and Smith 
1991).  
Participants were requested to think aloud while contemplating the scenario and 
the implications for the airline’s flight schedule. Prior to the experiments, a pilot 
experiment was conducted with a duty manager still in training. By using him as a 
participant in a pilot study, we ensured that the case qualified for our research purposes. 
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Based on the results of the pilot, no changes to the case or the simulation and interview 
procedure were deemed necessary. 
Experimental session  
The experiment took place in a quiet room away from the operations control room. 
Participants were handed out paper and pencil, and were seated in front of a computer 
that they were allowed to use. They were given a short instruction, explaining the goal 
of the experiment to them. After this instruction, three short assignments that were not 
related to the simulation scenario were given to the participant in order to practice 
thinking aloud, as recommended by Ericsson and Simon (1993) when using the think 
aloud method. Next, participants were asked to start the computer and all of the live 
programs that they would normally also use. They were requested to give a short 
description of these programs. This both increased the level of fidelity of the simulation 
scenario and allowed the experimenters to be better able to understand what the 
participant was doing when using the computer during the experiment. Finally, the 
participants were given a verbal description of the case and were handed out an 
assignment sheet with the same written description.  
After the experimental sessions, a short interview was held to ensure participants 
did not have any objections or felt hampered by the instruction to think aloud. No 
participants indicated any such issues. 
Quality assessment  
Assessing solution accuracy can be problematic in an ill-structured environment, as 
there is not one correct solution. Moreover, due to lack of feedback it is difficult to 
determine for any solution if it is satisfactory. However, solutions can be judged based 
on other criteria than sheer effectiveness. For example, in Airline Operations Control it 
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is very important that solutions are robust. This means that a solution does not have to 
be optimal, but it will have to allow for the option of taking quick complementary 
measures if necessary in the spur of the moment. By using criteria like robustness, it is 
possible to at least determine whether a given solution is better or worse than any other.  
An expert panel, consisting of two highly proficient Airline Operations Control 
decision makers at the airline based on job performance criteria, jointly judged solutions 
by rank ordering them. A bullet point summary containing the goals and actions of 
participants was extracted from each of the experimental transcripts and was handed out 
to them. One of these experts was also a research participant, but we did not consider 
this to be problematic, due to the two year time lag between the experimental sessions 
and the quality judgment. Moreover, in preparation for the quality assessment session 
the expert confirmed that he did not recognize the scenario. The presence of a second 
expert also enhanced the objectivity of their joint judgment. 
Coding Procedure 
All think aloud recordings were transcribed. Next, a coding scheme needed to be 
created that would allow for a detailed analysis of results. This scheme needed to be 
able to identify the smaller information processing elements that are incorporated in the 
various cognitive states of the decision ladder. We chose to use a coding scheme 
modelled after Goel and Pirolli (1992) that identified these elements at a very fine-
grained level. This allowed us to sift information carefully and eliminate all irrelevant 
information that participants came up with during the experiment. Specific 
combinations of elements were then tied to individual cognitive states. 
The coding scheme was validated by calculating inter-rater agreement levels. 
Three protocols were randomly selected and coded independently by two raters. The 
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correlation between the two raters was sufficiently high (Cohen’s kappa of resp. 0.75, 
0.72 and 0.78) to allow one rater to finish coding the remaining protocols. 
Measurement 
For each participant, statements concerning the development of a plan were mapped 
onto the cognitive states of the decision ladder. Consequently, each statement could be 
linked to one of three macrocognitive activities: sensemaking, option evaluation or 
action planning. The structure of participants’ cognitive decision making process was 
studied based on those activities in two ways. First, all macrocognitive activities were 
assessed in terms of the number of statements relating to each of the activities relative to 
the number of statements in the other categories. Second, rule-based versus knowledge-
based behaviour was identified by looking at the number of switches between different 
cognitive states of macrocognitive activities. A switch between cognitive states was 
labelled knowledge-based if it followed the perimeter of the decision ladder.  All other 
transitions between cognitive states were labelled rule-based. In addition to analysing 
the nature of transitions throughout the entire decision process,  they were also analysed 
per macrocognitive activity. For example, knowledge-based action planning consisted 
of all transitions towards cognitive states within the action planning activity that 
followed the perimeter of the decision ladder. Hence, switches from ‘aware of desired 
system state’ to ‘understand what needs to be done’, and switches between ‘understand 
what needs to be done’ and ‘satisfied plan achieves goal’ were labelled as such, whereas 
all other switches for action planning were labelled as rule-based. 
Decision quality was measured by rank ordering solutions. The solution that was 
considered to have the highest quality received a score of 15, whereas the lowest quality 
solution scored 1. All other solutions were scored somewhere in between. Next to a 
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relative rank ordering of solutions, the experts provided brief comments on each 
solution, giving us general insight into the absolute quality of solutions as well. 
Results 
We first studied frequency of statements for macrocognitive activities and knowledge 
versus rule-based behaviour in the data, after which we tested if there were any 
correlations between these patterns and decision quality, using Spearman’s Rho. This 
test was chosen because our data do not follow the normal distribution,  are rank 
ordered on a continuous ordinal scale, and because the Spearman test is less sensitive to 
outliers, which could skew results considerably due to our small sample size. Results 
are summarized in table 1.  
[Table 1 near here] 
Examples from the protocols that illustrate the use of the different macrocognitive 
activities by participants are added in tables 2 and 3. 
[Tables 2 and 3 near here] 
Structure of Macrocognitive Activities  
The general structure of the cognitive decision process, in terms of the different 
macrocognitive activities, shows that Airline Operations Control decision makers’ 
frequency of sensemaking statements is relatively high (49 percent , see figure 2), 
whereas the frequency of option evaluation statements is relatively low (17 percent). 
This is interesting, since this indicates that even though decision makers are dealing 
with a relatively unfamiliar event, they do not seem to be much engaged with 
prioritizing goals or establishing an appropriate target state.  
[Figure 2 near here] 
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We tested whether the number of statements dedicated to any one of the 
macrocognitive activities was related to decision quality. No relationships were found 
between the quality of solutions and frequency of sensemaking, option evaluation or 
action planning statements (resp. rs (13) = -0.021, p>.05; rs (13) = -0.468, p>.05; rs (13) 
=  0.274, p>.05). Frequency of statements dedicated to any one of the macrocognitive 
activities on the decision ladder does not reflect how good or bad solutions will 
eventually be. However, we did find a negative trend in the correlation between 
frequency of statements related to option evaluation and decision quality, although this 
was not significant at the .05 level.  
Knowledge and Rule-Based Transitions for Macrocognitive Activities 
We also analysed whether switches between the cognitive states within each of the 
macrocognitive activities are based on stored rules, or reflect knowledge-based decision 
making. Figure 3 shows the relative amounts of knowledge and  rule-based transitions 
for the decision making process in general, and for each of the macrocognitive activities 
separately. Rule-based transitions (69 percent) were used much more frequently than 
knowledge-based transitions  (31 percent), and is the result of increased rule-based 
decision making for sensemaking and action planning. Option evaluation on the other 
hand, shows equal amounts of rule-based and knowledge-based transitions.  
[Figure 3 near here] 
The eight transitions most frequently used are summarized in table 4, and are 
graphically depicted in figure 4. Six of those are rule-based, with three feedforward and 
three feedback loops. What stands out first, is that the most frequently used transitions 
are all part of the lower half of the decision ladder. Second, most of the cognitive 
processes employed by participants are centred around understanding what must be 
done. This understanding appears to be largely based on the use of recognition primed 
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rules, that allow participants to deduce actions directly from the dimensions of the 
situation or from awareness of the participated future system state (resp. switches 4 and 
6 in figure 4). Another rule-based transitions that is frequently used, is the recognition 
of the future system state based on the dimensions of the situation, without having to 
determine the status of the current system’s state first (switch 3 in figure 4).  
[Table 4 and Figure 4 near here] 
We analysed if knowledge-based transitions in the general decision making 
process were related to solution quality. This relationship proved to be statistically 
significant (rs (13) = -0.518, p<.05). The negative sign of the correlation indicates that 
higher frequency of knowledge-based transitions was associated with lower solution 
quality. To further investigate this unexpected result, we examined the correlation 
between these transitions and quality of solutions for each of the separate 
macrocognitive activities. For option planning, no such correlation was found (rs (13) = 
-0.054, p>.05). A significant negative relationship was found between frequency of 
knowledge-based transitions during sensemaking and solution quality (rs (13) = -0.530, 
p<.05), and between frequency of knowledge-based transitions during action planning 
and solution quality (rs (13) = -0.540, p<.05). This relationship was contrary to what one 
would expect. An increase of knowledge-based transitions for both sensemaking and 
action planning was found to correlate with lower quality of solutions. In other words, 
quality of solutions increases with an increase in rule-based behaviour. Moreover, 
knowledge-based sensemaking and knowledge-based action planning also correlated 
with each other (rs (13) = 0.541, p<.05), as one decreases when the other does. This 
suggests that the group of decision makers that has a low score for knowledge-based 
sensemaking and a high score for decision quality, consists largely of the same 
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individuals who have a low score for knowledge-based action planning and a high score 
for decision quality.  
Discussion 
The main purpose of the present study was to explore the structure of the decision 
making process of Airline Operations Control decision makers when dealing with non-
routine decisions, and to assess the way this structure is related to decision quality. To 
this end, this study has first mapped the activities of decision makers on the decision 
ladder. Subsequently it was analysed if the relative frequencies of articulations  of 
several macrocognitive activities on the ladder and their knowledge or rule-based nature 
was related to quality of decision outcomes. Results of this study show that when 
confronted with novel problems, the structure of professionals’ decision making process 
does not seem to change, as it still resembles the structure of the decision process of 
routine experts. Remarkably, this did not impede the quality of decision outcomes. 
There was a positive trend between higher quality of solutions and low frequency of 
statements dedicated to option evaluation. Moreover, the positive relationship between 
higher quality of solutions and lower  number of rule-based transitions shows that part 
of this routine expert behaviour is still effective, even under non-routine conditions.  
Below, conclusions are first discussed in light of the findings of this research. 
Second, based on a number of informal observations that we made during the 
experimental sessions, we also speculate on some additional explanations that could 
have led to these results. 
The general structure of the decision process of Airline Operations Control 
decision makers showed that on average, there is a relatively high percentage of 
statements for sensemaking compared to action planning and option evaluation. This is 
consistent with expert research showing that experts spend a great deal of time 
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analysing a problem qualitatively (Glaser and Chi 1988), particularly in ill-defined 
problems (Voss and Post 1988; Voss and Wiley 2006). Another type of behaviour that 
is generally associated with routine expertise was exhibited by Airline Operations 
Control decision makers for option evaluation. The low frequency of option evaluation 
statements reflects the general amount of rule-based cognitive processing, which is 
often shown by routine experts in naturalistic settings as they rely on recognition 
strategies (Klein 2003).  
Another expertise based view that can help to account for the general high 
amount of rule versus knowledge-based transitions, is that reshaping the entire flight 
schedule resembles a design process. Identifying solutions early on in the decision 
process is often shown in design problems, as expert-designers are solution focused 
(Cross 2004). After initial solution identification, they will mould the solution until it is 
considered effective (Klein and Brezovic 1986), causing several loops back and forth 
between sensemaking and action planning. We speculate that time pressure, and in 
addition the common Airline Operations Control notion that doing nothing is usually 
the worst decision anyone can take, could have amplified this effect, as decision makers 
are eager to arrive at solutions early.  
What was particularly interesting, is that rule-based behaviour was positively 
related to decision quality. In other words, quality of decision outcomes actually 
increased instead of decreased together with Airline Operations Control decision 
makers’ use of more rule-based decision making strategies. This was also reflected in 
the positive trend between lower numbers of option evaluation statements and higher 
decision quality. This result is remarkable, as it is generally assumed that decision 
makers can only adequately deal with non-routine problems in an ill-structured 
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environment by explicitly evaluating options (see for example Klein 1989; Lipshitz 
1997; Rasmussen 1986).  
Two explanations can be provided to account for this result: either the problem 
that was used in the experiment was not really unfamiliar, or Airline Operations Control 
professionals’ adaptive expertise enables them to reframe an unfamiliar problem into a 
familiar problem, allowing for recognition of solutions. This would be consistent with 
Simon (1973), who stated that experts will decompose ill-structured problems into 
multiple well-structured sub problems that can be solved by using their routine 
expertise. 
The first explanation, that the problem was not really unfamiliar, seems unlikely. 
Due to the low frequency of large scale disruptions and shift rotations, Airline 
Operations Control decision makers are confronted only one to three times per year with 
such events. Moreover, not only is it difficult to get adequate feedback on solutions due 
to the unstructured nature of the environment, at the airline studied feedback is also not 
formalized in the disruption management process.  
It could be argued that in Airline Operations Control, regardless of the nature of 
the problem, solutions on a high level are to a large extent similar and thus familiar. For 
example, in case of disruptions, whether small or large, eventually most actions come 
down to delaying or cancelling flights. However, this can only explain why the decision 
making process is initially rule-based. Determining the size and timing of the actions is 
what really matters, as these will largely shape the flight schedule and the goals that are 
aimed for. For example: cancelling a large number of flights right at the moment of 
impact of a disruption might save costs as delays are limited, but cancelling the same 
number of flights over a longer time span might free up resources during the rest of the 
day and hence provide more flexibility in case of additional unexpected issues. 
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The second explanation, suggested by Simon (1973), is more plausible. It is 
possible that Airline Operations Control decision makers who are able to gain 
sufficiently adequate situation awareness through sensemaking, are still capable of 
identifying actions based on recognition principles. We speculate that, especially in 
Airline Operations Control, many actions or options that can be applied under non-
routine circumstances probably have been applied before during routine operations, 
albeit on a smaller scale and perhaps not in combination with each other. For example, 
during a routine issue, such as unexpected prolongation of aircraft maintenance, 
decision makers will need to cancel a flight if a spare aircraft is unavailable. Focus 
during this action will be to determine which single flight that operates within the right 
time frame in the schedule, will minimize cancellation costs for the airline. During large 
scale disruptions, multiple flights in the schedule are impacted, and cancellation of 
flights will inevitably be one of the preferred actions. However, the focus will need to 
shift from just determining cancellation costs of single flights to include other schedule 
dynamics as well, as other issues such as crew rotations and positioning of aircraft also 
come into play. These issues are by themselves not unfamiliar, as they can be part of 
other small scale routine problems, but they are usually dealt with in relative isolation. 
The non-routine character of large scale problems is mainly caused by the combinations 
of factors that need to be dealt with all at once.  
The notion that Airline Operations Control decision makers can reframe an ill-
structured problem into multiple familiar sub problems, was strengthened by some 
informal observations during the simulation sessions. First, most participants would for 
example split the problem into issues caused by departure delays versus arrival delays. 
Departure delays would be further divided into problems caused by field closures at the 
end of the day, or delay problems caused by crew working hours. All of these sub 
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problems individually are familiar, and actions that are appropriate can be recognized. 
These actions were then refined and moulded until considered effective under the 
current circumstances.  
Second, we observed that after initial adoption of a recognized high level action, 
such as cancelling flights, additional constraints were identified through sensemaking. 
These were used as cut-off points, and were used to determine the scale and timing of 
the high level actions in greater detail. Many participants then used mental simulation to 
ascertain that detailed actions would result in a desired target state, in this case the flight 
schedule.  
Finally, constraints that were identified and elaborated on to limit the range of 
possible solutions, such as maintenance or crew issues, varied greatly between 
individuals and seemed largely to depend on personal experience gained in previous 
functions. Previous experience ranges from other Airline Operations Control jobs, such 
as dispatcher or crew planner, to experience outside the Airline Operations Control 
domain (for example, as a cabin attendant, or maintenance engineer). As no relationship 
was found between frequency of statements dedicated to either sensemaking or action 
planning on the one hand, and quality of decisions on the other, we surmise that 
familiarity with decision making content, rather than structure of macrocognitive 
activities, is related to quality of decisions when professionals are confronted with non-
routine issues (cf. Schraagen 1993). 
Implications for Airline Operations Control 
Although the current study has shed more light upon the structure of the decision 
making  process, it has also revealed that the nature of this process itself relies largely 
on rule-based transitions. The relationship between this type of decision making 
strategies and quality of the outcome also cautions against forcing Airline Operations 
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Control decision makers to engage in more knowledge-based decision making. But this 
does not solve Airline Operations Control’s management problem of not having insight 
into the reasons why certain decisions are made, and hence  believing that they are not 
in control of the decision process in their organisation. Moreover, solutions of different 
decision makers can differ widely, as the quality assessment reviewers’ comments 
revealed. As decisions are not evaluated afterwards, feedback on rule-based decision 
making strategies is not readily available. Consequently, less proficient decision makers 
have no opportunity to learn from their expert peers. Such feedback could ultimately 
help to reach more uniform decisions and hence ensure greater control over process 
quality, without impeding the use of rule-based decision making strategies or decision 
quality. 
Obviously, using rule-based decision making strategies does not equate with 
uncontrolled decision making. It only implies that it is difficult for an outside observer 
to clarify which mechanisms are used by the decision maker that lead to good quality 
solutions. This makes it critical to elicit not just the structure of the decision process, but 
also the decision content, for example cues and subsequent actions that trigger the use 
of rule-based strategies for some but not for other decision makers. Only then can we 
hope to effectively support the decision making process. Eventually, this should reduce 
the risk of the airline of running into operational chaos in the face of unexpected events, 
keeping both the airline’s management and its customers satisfied. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Due to time and resource constraints, our research sample was relatively small. More 
research with larger numbers of participants would be necessary in order to confirm if 
the results we found in this study are solid. On the other hand, we have sampled 
approximately half of the available operations controllers and duty managers within the 
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airline in our study. Another question is whether results can be extended to other 
domains as well, and what other macrocognitive processes besides the ones studied here 
are related to decision quality under unfamiliar conditions.  
Although afterward all participants agreed that the scenario used in the 
simulations was realistic enough, some of them mentioned that the main difference 
between the simulated scenario and real life is the absence of a sense of urgency and 
responsibility for severe consequences if the wrong decision is taken. This could have 
influenced the results of our study (Randel, Pugh, and Reed 1996). However, we believe 
that the selected research method is still to be preferred over examining the naturalistic 
environment, as this would have impacted the comparability of participants’ results. 
Moreover, it is difficult to predict when the events studied here arise (Farrington-Darby 
and Wilson 2006). Due to time constraints, this was considered a serious disadvantage. 
Finally, we noticed that there were large differences between individual decision 
outcomes in terms of measures taken to adapt the flight schedule. Reviewer comments 
indicated that decisions on the low end of the spectrum were indeed relatively poor, 
whereas the highest ranked plans were considered to be excellent. This raises two 
questions. First, why is it that some of the Airline Operations Control professionals 
were capable of transferring their knowledge and skills to deal effectively with non-
routine problems, whereas others were not? As all participants qualified at least as 
journeymen, years of experience in their current function, or even in the domain of 
Airline Operations Control, probably cannot or can only partly account for this, 
especially as participants’ focus on particular sub problems seems instead linked to 
previous experience. Moreover, although actions for sub problems were generated 
based on recognition, extrapolating actions from small scale routine disruptions to large 
scale non-routine disruptions requires certain creative problem solving skills as well. 
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This stresses the need for more research on the subject of adaptive expertise, and why it 
is gained by some experts, but not others. 
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Table 1. Summary of results. 
Correlation Result Accepted/Rejected
Frequency of sensemaking statements is 
related to level of quality of solutions 
rs (13) = 0.021, p>.05 Rejected 
 
Frequency of option evaluation statements is 
related to level of quality of solutions 
rs (13) = 0.468, p>.05 Rejected  
 
Frequency of action planning statements is 
related to level of quality of solutions 
rs (13) =  -0.274, p>.05 Rejected  
 
Frequency of knowledge-based transitions is 
related to quality of solutions 
rs (13) = -0.518, p<.05 Accepted 
Frequency of knowledge-based transitions for 
sensemaking is related to quality of solutions 
rs (13) = -0.530, p<.05 Accepted 
Frequency of knowledge-based transitions for 
option evaluation is related to quality of 
solutions 
rs (13) = -0,054, p>.05 Rejected 
Frequency of knowledge-based transitions for 
action planning is related to quality of 
solutions 
rs (13) = -0.540, p<.05 Accepted 
Frequency of knowledge-based transitions for 
sensemaking is related to frequency of 
knowledge-based transitions for action 
planning 
rs (13) = 0.541, p<.05 Accepted 
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 Table 2. Examples of participants' statements for macrocognitive activities. 
Macrocognitive 
activity 
Citation 
Sensemaking Participant 14: ‘Low ceiling [of clouds], 600 foot. And later on 
conditions will get worse, because we will get freezing fog with low 
visibility. So capacity will be restricted from 1600 [Zulu] onwards. 
And this restriction will not so much be determined by runway use, 
but by our own de-icing capacity.’  
Participant 35: ‘You look at a fairly uncertain probability. A prob40 
tempo, which means there is a chance of 40 percent of something 
happening for a short period of time. So you have to take that into 
account. But if it happens you got to have a plan. Otherwise the 
operation will come to a halt.’ 
Action 
Planning 
Participant 25: ‘… we have a cancellation tool that indicates which 
[flights] are possible candidates [for cancellation], but there is a 
crew schedule attached [to the flights] as well which is not 
connected to the tool. So we may want something, but we will have to 
check with cockpit and cabin [crew scheduling] if the proposal we 
have based on the tool, a priority list, whether that is feasible for 
them.’   
Participant 33: ‘I also would cancel all short up and down flights that 
have a crew that goes up- and down together with the aircraft. So the 
Paris and Manchester flights, which operate multiple times per day. 
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And the ones that can be reached by means of ground 
transportation.’   
Option 
Evaluation 
Participant 15: ‘We cannot accommodate all of our inbound flights. 
So we will have to choose whether we want to accommodate them 
somewhere else, so whether we leave them at outstations or let them 
divert to a different airport.’ 
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Table 3. Examples of participants' knowledge-based macrocognitive activities. 
Knoweledge-based 
macrocognitive activities 
Citation 
Knowledge-based 
Sensemaking  
Participant 12: ‘17 flights per hour inbound and outbound 
airport capacity from 1600 Zulu. [] Our last flights are 
scheduled to leave at 2300. [] I will process that in our 
Estimation tool. The tool shows an operational delay of 
2,5 hours.’ 
Knowledge-based 
Option Evaluation 
Participant12: ‘[I would cancel 40 legs at 1800 Zulu, and 5 
legs after that.] Maybe we could leave those last 5 legs 
out, which would give us an average delay at 2200 Zulu of 
50 minutes. Yes, [for crew] that should be legally 
acceptable. At 2300 Zulu we’re clear. 
Knowledge-based Action 
Planning 
Participant 32: ‘… the ICA fleet will be protected, so we 
will have to cancel most of our European flights.’ 
Participant 21: ‘… if we still want to operate flights in the 
evening block, we need to cancel flights in the late 
afternoon block. We will have to check which flights we 
can still operate crew wise, and check which possibilities 
we have to dispose of passengers.’ 
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Table 4. Participants’ most frequently used transitions between cognitive states. 
Transi
tion 
Average 
use 
Used by # of 
participants  
Type Description 
1 5 15 Feedback 
loop 
The desired system state is 
reconsidered based on possible actions 
2 5 15 Knowledge-
based switch 
Actions are selected based on the 
desired system state 
3 5 14 Rule-based 
switch (based 
on 
recognition) 
The future system state is directly 
recognized based on the dimensions of 
the situation 
4 4 15 Rule-based 
switch (based 
on 
recognition) 
Actions are directly recognized based 
on the dimensions of the situation 
5 4 15 Feedback 
loop (mental 
simulation) 
Dimensions of the situation are re-
examined to check if actions are 
appropriate 
6 4 12 Rule-based 
switch (based 
on 
recognition) 
Actions are directly recognized based 
on the anticipated future system state 
7 3 13 Feedback 
loop 
Dimensions of the situation are re-
examined based on the anticipated 
future system state 
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8 3 12 Feedback 
loop 
The anticipated future system state is 
re-evaluated to check if actions are 
appropriate 
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Figure 1. Macrocognitive activities mapped onto the decision ladder (adapted from 
Lintern 2010). Cognitive states are represented in squares. The arrows represent the 
various rule-based (in dotted lines) and knowledge-based (solid lines) cognitive 
processes that connect them. 
Figure 2. Relative frequency of statements per macrocognitive activity 
Figure 3. Relative knowledge-based and rule-based processing of macrocognitive 
activities. 
Figure 4. Participants’ most frequently used transitions between cognitive states 
(numbered 1 to 8). Numbers are referenced in table 4. 
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